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Summary 
Paper analyses the relationship between R&D and innovation in countries of central and 
eastern Europe. It points to a gap between local demand and supply for R&D and 
innovation as one of the key issues for long-term growth of the region.  Analysis is based 
on innovation survey, R&D, patent and business survey data. Based on analysis the paper 
develops policy implications. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
So far, growth and recovery of post-socialist countries of central and east Europe 
(CEE) was based on efficiency gains from reallocations between sectors and firms, and 
on the firm level productivity improvements. Growth was not based on local R&D and 
extensive innovation activities. In order to grow further, CEECs will have to accumulate 
new knowledge and acquire new technology. In the core of this problem is the 
(mis)match between local demand and supply for technology which we explore in this 
paper.  Economists are usually concerned with the issues of aggregate (mis)match 
between market demand and supply or supply and demand for products. However, 
demand and supply for products are not identical to demand and supply for technology 
(R&D and innovation). Technology is an intermediate input and output in economic 
process and in an increasingly knowledge intensive economy it has become essential for 
understanding the growth and its structural problems. In this paper, we explore this issue 
in the context of the CEECs using primarily statistical data, leaving theoretical issues 
aside and by developing policy relevant conclusions from data analysis.  Our evidence on 
the gap between demand and supply of R&D and innovation and its determinants is not 
systematic. Nevertheless, we believe that even with this constraint our analysis contains 
empirically and policy relevant insights and conclusions. 
The first part points to the emerging gap between lacking demand for technology 
and growth. Due to absent demand for technology, there has been sizeable downsizing 
of R&D in the CEECs. The second part analyses the relationship between R&D and 
innovation activities as well as the main sources of knowledge for innovation. This points 
to the (mis)match between current S&T system and changing sources of innovation. 
Conclusions draw policy implications. 
 
 
Growth, R&D and innovation 
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Growth and recovery in CEECs during the 1990s has not been linked to 
domestic R&D and technology effort. Moreover, recovery in demand has not been 
accompanied by recovery in demand for technology. Figure 1 shows that the relationship 
for eight CEECs has been slightly negative, i.e. countries that have grown faster in the 
period 1999-94 had relatively sharper fall in resident patent applications than economies 
that continued to decline. Although number of countries is far too limited to generalise 
the proposition on negative relationship, it is safe to conclude there seems to be not clear 
relationship between domestic technology activity and economic recovery.  Recovery or 
decline are not strongly linked to domestic technological activity which seems to have its 
own autonomy. Elsewhere, we show that recovery and growth of Polish and decline in 
growth of Russia have led to similar decline of their R&D systems.  This suggests that 
recovery of demand for local R&D and innovation may not emerge automatically with 
return of growth.  
 
 
Figure 1: Index of GDP and resident patent applications in 1999-94 period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, CDROM, 2002 
 
Business surveys in CEECs suggest that there is clear easing of demand side difficulties 
in all CEECs for which survey data are available. Demand constraints were notable in the 
first half of the 1990s.  Figure 2 shows that there has been significant decrease in demand 
side difficulties for ‘young’ firms in CEECs. On that basis, we would expect that demand 
side improvements would be followed by an increasing demand for technology.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Change in proportion of demand side difficulties of enterprises today (2001) and at start 
up (established in 1998) 
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Source: Based on Eurostat, New enterprises in candidate countries, 2003 
 
 
However, this improvement in demand side conditions has not been followed by equally 
strong improvement in supply side conditions. Figure 3 shows much more diversified 
picture regarding different supply side difficulties. Moreover, one of increasing 
constraints for new firms has been a lack of technology and limited access to trained 
workers.  
 
Figure 3: Change in proportion of supply side difficulties of today (2001) and at start up 
(established in 1998) 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat, New enterprises in candidate countries, 2003 
 
This has been coupled by the lack of funds and by worsening in liquidity (non or 
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A clear improvements in demand side conditions suggest that the problems for 
innovators and entrepreneurs have now shifted to supply side, especially to issues of 
access to credit, own funds and liquidity of clients despite indications by companies that 
clients are now less financially constrained (see figure 2). This may suggest that the 
problem is not the general lack of liquidity but the mismatch between liquid supply and 
demand. In addition, firms are increasingly facing other supply side problems like trained 
workforce, and lack of technology. This is quite new phenomenon and suggests that the 
CEECs are entering into new stage of entrepreneurship where requirements for growth 
have become more variegated and related less to finance by itself but increasingly to the 
quality of supply and matching of supply and demand. From policy perspective, this 
points to the problem of weak financial systems, which are mediating between supply 
and demand, and to the importance of national innovation system. 
 
R&D in the post-socialist period 
 
R&D system plays a relatively limited role in the current performance of the 
CEE economies. Given their income levels, the CEECs have still relatively large 
numbers of research scientist and engineers (RSE) while many of them have relatively 
favorable education structure of population. Both these factors should, according to new 
growth theory, produce much more robust growth than we have observed during the 
1990s. Yet, recovery of the CEECs during the 1990s was unrelated to their R&D. Simple 
correlation coefficients between growth of GDP and share of GERD/GDP for 1992-
1999 period are negative for six out of nine CEE economies. 
However, we should not assess the importance of R&D system just based on its 
current role. Restructuring of R&D is one the key preconditions for further industrial 
upgrading. As figure 3 suggest, we observe for the first time that technology is seen as 
limiting factor for growth. During the 1990s, R&D has not been felt as constraint to 
growth. Growth has been generated from reallocations rather than from technology 
accumulation. Hence, demand for local R&D was quite limited. As a result, we have seen 
radical shrinking of R&D systems in all CEECs.  Figure 4 shows the share of 
expenditures in R&D in GDP for CEECs. 
 
Figure 4: Gross expenditures for R&D in GDP, 1990-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU (2002) ;  
For Moldova and Belarus, DB of CIS Statistical Committee, data are not comparable to OECD definitions  
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For 1990-1991 OECD, Centre for Co-operation with Non-Memebers     
 
 
From having very high shares of R&D expenditures at the end of the socialism, which 
ranged from 2.5% to 1% (1990) of GDP CEE economies investments in R&D fell to a 
range between 0.5% to 1.4% (1999) of GDP. This downfall can be disaggregated into 
three distinct periods. First, in the period between 1990 and 1993/94, with the falling 
GDPs the share of expenditures for R&D also declined sharply leading to a very high 
absolute declines in funding of large R&D systems. This was followed by the period of 
stabilisation (1993/94 to 1996) in which decline continued but at significantly lower rate. 
From 1996, signs of recovery in some economies, in both absolute and relative funding 
of R&D, have emerged. However, in some CEECs, like Romania R&D decline 
continued uninterrupted. In overall, after average annual decrease of 13% in 1991-96 
period, the relative share of R&D on average grew by 3.2% annually in 1997-199 period.  
 
From perspective of growth and restructuring, it is important what has happened to 
business enterprise sector R&D. Data show that that the shares of R&D funded by 
business enterprise sector in CEECs have remained relatively stable over the whole 
period. In other words, business enterprise sector has shared the destiny of the overall 
decline, absolute and relative, of R&D sector. (See figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Share of R&D performed by business enterprise sector, 1992-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU (2002) 
 
National differences in the share of R&D funded by business have remained suggesting 
that the transition could not change strong structural and nationally specific features in 
R&D systems.  A high shares of R&D funding by business sector in Czech Republic and 
Slovakia and very low in Baltic states are the result of differences in industry structure, 
especially in terms of the role of large firms as well as of neglect of R&D in Baltic states 
during the early 1990s. A high share of R&D performed by business enterprise sector in 
Russia and Romania indicates primarily unreformed R&D sector which is dominated by 
extra-mural industrial R&D institutes rather than strong in-house R&D. At the same 
time, in both countries there is a low share of R&D funding by industry and high share of 
government funding of business sector R&D. This situation is generally rare in market 
economies and can be taken as an indicator of the slow restructuring in R&D. Our 
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research (see Radosevic, 1999) suggests that the Russian innovation system is moving 
towards a situation where the in-house R&D activities of enterprises are playing a more 
important role than the extra-mural R&D activities. However, the role of extra-mural 
R&D activities continues to be significant suggesting that some elements of the Soviet 
R&D model as described by Gokhberg (1997) are still operating. 
 
Figure 6: Share of R&D performed by business enterprise sector, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU (2002) 
 
 
 
A simultaneous fall in government funding and weak demand for R&D from industry 
have blocked sectoral structural change within R&D systems which adjusted to lacking 
demand by overall shrinking. As we analyzed elsewhere, (Radosevic and Auriol, 1999) 
downsizing of the R&D systems in CEE  was not systematically linked to a specific 
individual factor on the demand or supply side. Probably, it is the combination of 
demand side factors (annual changes in GDP and investments) and supply side policies 
(budgetary R&D policy) that in the end have shaped trends in R&D spending. Neither 
government nor market demand for R&D could buffer this fall. However, this does not 
mean that there was not change at micro-level in R&D system. For analysis of Russian 
situation in S&T from this perspective see Radosevic (2003) 
 
 
Business R&D and innovation 
 
The supply of R&D is only a part of the overall process of innovation that leads 
to a finished product being placed on the market or to economic growth at national level. 
The fall in aggregate R&D spending hides the changing nature of innovation and its 
sources. So, if we want to understand why there has been decrease in demand for R&D 
we should look beyond R&D sector to the nature of innovation process. 
Research and development data measure the size of institutionalized knowledge 
generation activities. Small and discontinuous R&D activities usually closely linked to 
production are not covered by R&D surveys (Sirrili, 1998). Moreover, continuous and 
institutionalised research activities are not necessarily used as input into innovation 
process. This is especially apparent in ‘catching-up’ economies where behind the frontier 
R&D work is usually much less integrated with innovation activities than in economies at 
the world technology frontier.  
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The differences in the structure of innovation expenditures should indicate 
differences in the main types of innovation activities. Taking into account differences in 
developmental levels between the EU and the CEE we would expect that the structure 
of innovation expenditures should be significantly different. Countries that are behind 
the technology frontier should spent relatively more on embodied technologies and on 
downstream innovation activities like reverse engineering, product and process imitation 
than on R&D.  
The analysis of the innovation expenditures by Evangelista et al (1997a) shows 
that, first, the distribution of innovation costs is relatively coherent over all EU countries. 
If innovation costs reflect the scope of different innovation activities than the mix of 
innovative activities appears rather similar across EU. The second conclusion based on 
the EU innovation survey is that the industrial innovative process consists, first and 
foremost, of the purchase and use of ‘embodied’ technologies (innovative machinery and 
plants), which account for 50% of total expenditures on innovation (ibid). Third, among 
the ‘intangible’ innovation expenditures R&D activities are confirmed to be a central 
component of the technological activities of firms (see Evangelista et al, 1997b, fig 2, p 
529). Fourth, across all European countries expenditure-wise, the acquisition of 
‘disembodied’ technology through patent and licences emerges as a secondary innovation 
component when compared to the technological sources (ibid). 
 
 
 Figure 7:  Innovation expenditures in manufacturing, in %    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: R&D and innovation statistics in candidate countries and the Russian Federation        
Data 1996-97, EC, Theme 9, R&D, 2000 
For Slovakia, Slovak Statistical Office. For Turkey, Turkish Statistics Institute 
For EU (2000) Statistics of Innovation in Europe, Eurostat, Luxembourg 
 
A comparison of structure of innovation expenditures for the group of non-EU 
countries in figure 7 shows that there are significant differences as compared with the 
EU costs structure. R&D cost amount to smaller share of innovation expenditures than 
in the EU. Only Slovenia, which is the most developed CEECs, has share of R&D 
similar to the EU. Acquisition of machinery and equipment amounts to the biggest item 
among innovation expenditures. In particular, in Romania, innovation activity is 
essentially about installing new equipment. This cost structure reflects the nature of 
innovation in CEECs, which is primarily based around new equipment, most often 
imported. 
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Enterprises do not innovate on their own.  Their technological upgrading is 
dependent on the supply chain (suppliers and buyers) within which they operate, on 
degree of competition and on ‘social networks’ on which they can rely. Figure 8 shows 
the main sources of information for innovation in four CEECs. Data confirm the 
importance of direct business environment of firms as the main source of knowledge for 
innovation. Quality of clients, competitors, buyers, and of social networks within which 
enterprises operate are the key to their innovation. Universities, consultants and R&D 
institutes are not the source of direct knowledge or at least seem to be a secondary 
source. This is not surprising and corresponds to EU innovation surveys. Universities 
serve as sources of skilled professionals i.e. as indirect knowledge providers rather than 
as direct sources of knowledge for information.  
 
Figure 8: Sources of information for innovation in manufacturing 
(% of innovators considering the following sources of information as very important) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: R&D and innovation statistics in candidate countries and the Russian Federation 1990-1999, Eurostat 
Note: External knowledge organisations (average of importance for universities, consultants and R&D 
institutes) 
Value chain (average importance between clients and suppliers) 
Social networks (average importance of professional conferences, meetings, fairs, exhibitions, electronic 
networks) 
Other (patents,) 
 
 However, when we compare the importance of external vs. internal sources of 
information for innovation between EU and the average of four CEECs  and Turkey we 
observe that in less developed economies the external sources of knowledge are more 
important than knowledge within enterprise1. 
  Figure 9 shows that competitors, social networks and external knowledge 
organisations all play more important role for innovators in than in the EU. One the 
other hand, own sources of knowledge for innovation are more important in more 
developed context than in less developed CEEs and Turkey. 
 
                                                 
1
 We compare weighted EU average with the unweighted average of five countries. This makes sense 
as our EU indicator becomes biased towards bigger and technology developed countries like Germany, 
France and UK. In addition, we do not have data for the CEECs and Turkey to calculate weighted 
average. 
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Figure 9: External and internal sources of information for innovation 
between EU and four CEECs and Turkey 
(% of innovators considering the following sources of information as very important) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: R&D and innovation statistics in candidate countries and the Russian Federation 1990-1999, Eurostat; 
Turkish National Statistical Office and EU (2002) 
Notes: see figure 8 
 
Value chain (suppliers and buyers) play similarly important role in both groups of 
countries. This finding has important policy implications. First, it points to the relatively 
bigger importance of national system of innovation (competitors, social networks, 
external knowledge organisations) for innovators in the CEECs. Their innovation 
capabilities are dependent on systemic features of external environment in which they 
operate. Secondm weak innovation capability of local firms, which are not able to 
generate new knowledge within their own R&D activities, points a need to support firm 
level R&D or to induce demand for internal knowledge. 
Relatively bigger dependence on external sources of knowledge in less developed 
environments suggests that CEECs are dependent on FDI for new knowledge. Weak 
innovation capabilities of local firms and the gap between ‘old’ S&T system and new 
sources of knowledge for enterprises led to increasing reliance on foreign technologies. 
Limited data for the CEECs suggest that the FDI is an important channel for inflow of 
new knowledge as expressed through payments for licences. Correlation coefficient 
between payments for licences and FDI inflows for the six CEECs for which data are 
available is positive and moderate (0.455)2 (figure 10).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Identical correlation coefficient for 10 ‘catching up’ economic (China, India, South Africa, east Asian 
and Latin American economies) is low (0.122) suggesting that channels of technology inflows are not 
confined only on FDI.  
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Figure 10: Payments for licences and FDI inflows, 1998, $mn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2003, Geneva  
 
This suggests that local firms have to rely on FDI in order to gain new knowledge. A 
comparatively high presence of FDI in some CEECs like Poland, Hungary and Czech 
shows that they have been relatively successful in that respect. This is the strength but 
also the weakness of innovation in the CEECs. Exclusive reliance on knowledge from 
abroad as well as on weak national system of innovation, coupled with very weak 
innovation capability of domestic firms represent the most vulnerable aspect of the CEE 
economies. In short and medium term, the exclusive reliance on FDI leads to quick 
productivity improvements. However, in a long-term, this creates fragile economies 
whose narrow specialisations in FDI related activities and weak national system of 
innovation may become obstacle to further upgrading. Trade off between short term 
efficiency and long-term strategic orientation and flexibility are the key emerging issues 
for frontrunner economies of central Europe, like Hungary, Czech R and Poland. Other 
CEECs, in particular east European economies (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine) will 
have to reply on FDI as the way to gain quick access to new technologies. However, in 
both groups of countries the key long-term issue is how to achieve complementarity 
between domestic and foreign sources of knowledge. 
  
   
 
Conclusions 
Our analysis has several important implications for the development policy in the 
CEECs. 
First, recovery and growth will be not automatically followed by recovery of 
demand for domestic R&D and innovation. In fact, some CEE countries may exhaust 
sources of growth which come from reallocations, closures and lays offs and face 
structural problems of further upgrading. This new threshold levels for upgrading will be 
not exclusively related to the institutional system of market economy which has been 
addressed through transition related policies but will be related to weakness of national 
systems of innovation and its integration with FDI. Any national system of innovation is 
a system based on public – private and local – global interfaces and interactions. It is the 
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challenge for policy makers to facilitate the emergence of public – private interfaces, 
which are essential to market economy. 
Transformation of the CEECs during the 1990s shows that innovation does take 
place even with ineffective innovation policy. Slovenia, Poland and Hungary are clear 
examples of this. If so, is innovation policy indispensable? Indeed, impact of innovation 
policy should not be overestimated. However, we should bear in mind that the sources 
of growth in CEECs are changing. During most of the ten years of transition growth has 
been unrelated to domestic technology accumulation. Large-scale reallocations from 
unproductive parts of industry to services, from less to more efficient firms have ensured 
growth for some period. However, there are signs that the sources of productivity 
growth, which have been mainly in realm of ‘reallocations’, are now coming to an end 
and that the CEECs will have to grow based on technology accumulation. For example, 
Kubielas (2003), in case of Poland, argues that Ricardian adjustment based on 
reallocations has been exhausted and that Polish growth is now dependent on imported 
technology. Since Poland has lost chance that it had during the 1990s to strengthen 
absorptive capacity of its R&D system it is now entirely dependent on FDI to ensure 
continuous technology accumulation.  
It may happen that innovation will continue to develop in some CEECs entirely 
based on local or export demand. However, if growth is to depend on the strength of 
national innovation system than innovation policy is one of important factors to facilitate 
domestic technology accumulation and diffusion. National systems are everywhere 
hybrid systems and require public - private co-operation. CEECs may still grow for some 
time unrelated to domestic R&D and without innovation policy. However, they may 
soon reach limits to this type of growth and face structural barrier or threshold level, 
which will require new national system of innovation and policies to be overcome. 
Innovation policy is not a quick fix. In order to be successful it requires a broader 
consensus of various stakeholders. As CEECs show this policy is easier to establish in 
periods of growth rather than depression. However, this also reduces pressure for its 
development. In addition, its long-term nature does not ensure clear benefits in 4-year 
cycle politics. All this suggest that demand for innovation policy is not articulated easy 
and that we should not be too optimistic regarding its establishment in CEECs. 
 
Second, high tech seems to be the dominant paradigm in innovation policy in 
CEECs despite data which suggest that innovation in these countries is very much linked 
to equipment and with limited R&D component. As pointed in example by Nauwelaers 
and Reid (2003) this leads to narrow client base of 50 large companies for Estonian 
innovation policy. In other countries this means that attracting high tech through S&T 
parks actually functions as substitute for innovation policy. In the best case, this route 
can create isolated pockets of competencies in new technology but will leave untouched 
majority of local firms. This is not to argue that this route should not be pursued but 
only that it should not serve as substitute for innovation policy. 
The relevance of this policy can best be seen when comparing marginal relative position 
of CEECs in US or EPO patenting. On the other hand, innovation surveys and R&D 
data, which show gradual increase in BERD, suggest that innovative firms are 
increasingly involved in technology activities but these are not necessary high tech. This 
points to increasing wedge between R&D and innovation policy, (see Kubielas, 2003, for 
the case of Poland). CEECs will have to close the gap, which currently exist between 
dominant R&D policy and subservient innovation policy. As CEECs increasingly try to 
emulate EU policies and try to restructure towards knowledge-based activities this gap 
will become unviable. Shift towards knowledge based economy in CEECs will mean (i) 
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shift towards diffusion oriented activities within R&D system, and (ii) transformation 
towards enterprises based R&D system. 
As interactive innovation model suggest this will not mean irrelevance of R&D 
but integration of R&D and innovation activities. While this may sound simple in 
conceptual terms this shift is very difficult to make in policy terms. How to move form 
current situation where ‘science’ and ‘innovation’ are seen in policy terms as zero sum 
game between science establishment and weak ‘innovation community’ towards positive 
sum game situation or situation where reorientation of both areas will be of mutual 
benefit. 
 
Third, policy should assist transformation of the S&T system into market 
oriented technology or knowledge infrastructure. For this transformation to take place it 
is essential to develop explicit innovation policy.  
After ten years of implementation of transition-based policies, central European 
economies have started to introduce innovation policy measures. The emergence of 
innovation policy in these economies shows that there are important changes taking 
place in their political philosophies. From being reduced to building the institutional 
framework of ‘open market economy’ and promotion of, at least rhetorically, minimalist 
role of the state we observe the shift towards more pro-active role of the state. However, 
innovation policy should be squared with the specific context in which it has to operate.  
Innovation surveys show that direct market and social environment of enterprise 
is the main source of information for innovation3. Yet, this aspect is not taken into 
account by innovation policy, which is rarely sector specific or technology specific. 
Innovation surveys show that sector and technology specific measures could matter 
more for innovativeness of enterprises when compared to general measures like tax 
incentives or horizontal measures like innovation centres and S&T parks. 
As innovation surveys in CEECs suggest innovation links are value chain based, 
i.e. they are the strongest with suppliers and buyers immediately after intra-firm sources. 
This is the strength but also the weakness of innovation systems in CEECs. Production 
integration through FDI led value chains ensures high productivity, innovation linkages 
and regular sales to local firms. However, in the long-term, product and technology 
upgrading does not necessary follow value chain logic, especially when value chains are 
changing or breaking-up. Again, this means that innovation policy will have to strike 
balance between supporting integration of local firms into global value chains (FDI, 
subcontracting) and domestic linkages with universities, S&T parks, cooperative centers, 
etc. Integration of local firms through value chains and FDI is policy which has been 
relatively undeveloped in CEECs. Hungary and Czech Republic are the only two 
candidate countries which have developed elements of this policy which goes beyond 
marketing of country as production location. There has been much more policy focus on 
linkage mechanisms like S&T parks, innovation centers, etc. i.e on linkages for which 
weak and dependent local firms may not have immediate demand rather than on value 
chain linkages. This explains their irrelevance to local firms and their innovation 
activities, which are, primarily value chain driven. A challenge for CEECs is how to 
integrate FDI and innovation policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  This is what interactive model of Kline and Rosenberg would suggest to be the typical situation. 
In Walter Leal Filho (ed) Supporting the Development of R&D and the Innovation 
Potential of Post-Socialist Countries, IOS Press, 2004 
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